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On the Limitations of Moral Exemplarism: Socio-Cultural Values and 
Gender  
Abstract 
In this paper, I highlight and discuss two significant limitations of Zagzebski’s (in 
Exemplarist moral theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) exemplarist moral theory. 
Although I focus on Zagzebski’s theory, I argue that these limitations are not unique to her 
approach but also feature in previous versions of moral exemplarism.  
 
The first limitation I identify is inspired by MacIntyre’s (in After virtue, Duckworth, London, 
1981) understanding of the concept of virtue and stems from the realization that the emotion 
of admiration, through which agents identify exemplars, should not be examined in vacuo. 
Scholars working on moral exemplarism have failed to note that admiration is substantially 
influenced by prevailing socio-cultural norms and values. I show that ‘the admirable’ varies 
across cultures and time; and the employment of one’s own emotion of admiration in order 
to derive the meaning of terms such as virtue and duty would only result in a culture-specific 
understanding of morality.  
The second limitation, inspired by Butler’s (in Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion 
of identity, Routledge, London, 1990) social constructivist understanding of gender, rests on 
the realization that several features and characteristics of the agent influence their perception 
of moral excellence. I focus on the issue of gender and highlight that exemplarist theories 
justify (and perpetuate) a counter-intuitive gender-specific understanding of morality.   
Keywords: Exemplarist moral theory, admiration, Zagzebski, MacIntyre, Butler. 
 
1. Introductory Remarks 
 
Initially, exemplarist theories were chiefly developed as a response to the objection 
that contemporary (see, for example, Louden, 1984, p. 229; Solomon, 1988 pp. 432-433) 
and ancient (see, for example, Williams, 1985, p. 85; Schneewind, 1990, p. 62) theories of 
virtue ethics do not provide specific criteria for moral action guidance1 - and are thus 
inferior to utilitarian and deontological theories. According to these exemplarist 
approaches, agents receive guidance for action through the identification and imitation of 
virtuous agents2 (Annas, 2004, pp. 68-69; Zagzebski, 2010, pp. 51-52).  
Still, Zagzebski (2015, 2017) has recently argued for an exemplarist theory that is not 
intended as a complementary theory to virtue ethics but is rather a distinct moral theory. 
Zagzebski builds this theory on the emotion of admiration and proposes deriving the 
meaning of value terms such as virtue, good end, good motive, admirable life, desirable 
life and deontic terms such as duty, right action, wrong action from ‘the admirable’. She 
                                                          
1And were thus termed exemplarist virtue approaches to moral guidance (e.g. Annas, 2004 and 
Zagzebski, 2010). For a different line of defense to the objection that virtue ethics do not provide 
an adequate account of right action see, for example, Hursthouse’s (1991, 1999) v-rule approach.  
2A suggestion inspired by Aristotelian virtue ethics. See, for example, NE, II, 1103a30-b25.  
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argues, for example, that “A right act for a person A in some set of circumstances C is what 
the admirable (more specifically practically wise) person would take to be most favored by 
the balance of reasons for A in C” (2017, p. 22) and defines virtue as an enduring trait of 
character - consisting of a motivational and a success component - that is worthy of our 
admiration (p. 114).  
 For Zagzebski (2017), emotions can give justifications for propositional moral 
judgements (p. 145). For instance, she argues that when an agent is feeling disgusted from 
a specific behavior, then her emotion of disgust gives her reason to judge that the behavior 
in question is morally wrong3. Likewise, the emotion of admiration can be employed by 
agents to identify behaviors and traits that are admirable, and thus worthy of emulation. 
According to Zagzebski, admiration leads us to identify and emulate moral exemplars4: “If 
I admire a person and reflectively endorse my admiration, I will rationally judge the person 
to be admirable in the relevant respect, and if I am right that emotions can be both epistemic 
and practical reasons, then my judgement that the person is admirable is a reason to emulate 
the admirable person, arising from my own critical self-reflection” (p. 152)5. For 
Zagzebski, exemplars do not simply reveal the right course of action in a given scenario, 
but most importantly motivate agents to improve in the moral domain and serve as guides 
for moral training (p. 130). 
However, despite the merits of Zagzebski’s (2015, 2017) exemplarist moral theory and 
its seemingly positive reception by other scholars (especially those working on moral 
education6), my aim in this paper is to highlight and discuss two rather significant 
limitations7 that can be found at its core. Zagzebski (2017) notes at the beginning of her 
book (entitled ‘Exemplarist Moral Theory’) that “it is important to keep in mind that our 
moral practices pre-exist theory. It is an illusion to think that moral theory can be 
constructed outside of the practices the theory is attempting to systematize and justify” (p. 
8). Still, despite her argument, I will show that she has done precisely what she urges 
against; she has developed a moral theory which disregards the societal contexts within 
which moral practices take place. Both theoretical limitations highlighted in this paper arise 
from taking into consideration the influence of socio-cultural moral norms and values on 
the agents’ identification of ‘the admirable’. 
The remaining of this paper is divided in three main sections. In the section that 
follows (section 2), I argue that Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory (2015. 2017) does 
not consider the import and influence of prevailing socio-cultural norms and values on the 
agents’ identification of ‘the admirable’. I show, with the use of examples, that ‘the 
                                                          
3According to Zagzebski (2017, p. 145), for example, the feeling that “his behavior towards her 
was disgusting” gives the agent reasons to judge that “his behavior towards her was wrong”.   
4Zagzebski (2017) is employing the theory of direct reference (see Putnam, 1979 and Kripke, 1980) 
to identify exemplars by direct reference - “people like that” who she describes as “…most imitable 
or most deserving of emulation. They are most imitable because they are most admirable.” (p. 16)  
5It is important to note, at this initial stage of the paper, that Zagzebski stresses that agents should 
not trust their emotion of admiration blindly but should be critically reflective of it (see also 
Zagzebski, 2017, p. 146).  
6See for example, Croce and Vaccarezza, 2017; Engelen et al, 2018; Vaccarezza and Niccoli, 2018; 
Groce, 2019.  
7I call them limitations (and will continue to do so throughout the manuscript) because they are 
theoretical outcomes (possibly acceptable for some scholars) which Zagzebski, and other scholars 
working on moral exemplarism, would consider as problems for the theory and thus want to resist. 
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admirable’ is greatly influenced8 by established socio-cultural norms and values and thus 
leads to a culture-specific understanding of morality (which goes against the claims of 
objectivity that underly moral exemplarism). Then, in the next section (section 3), I argue 
that Zagzebski’s theory neither gives an account nor takes into consideration that the 
agents’ identification of ‘the admirable’- and thus their identification of those persons most 
deserving of emulation - is also largely affected by several features and characteristics of 
the agent. Scholars working on moral exemplarism seem to ignore the significance of 
personal features and characteristics, such as gender and age, to the kind of guidance one 
gets from exemplarism. More specifically, I focus on the issue of gender and argue that 
exemplarist theories seem to provide justification for (and perpetuate) a counterintuitive 
gender-specific understanding of morality9.  
Throughout my discussion (sections 2 and 3), I note that these two highly interwoven 
theoretical limitations do not only undermine Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory but 
also previous versions of moral exemplarism (e.g. Blum, 1988; Annas, 2004). I entertain 
possible replies to the two limitations and argue that these limitations are caused by core 
features of the theory and cannot thus be removed without greatly distorting its essence.  
 
2. Exemplarism and Socio-Cultural Norms and Values 
 
In her exemplarist moral theory, Zagzebski (2015, 2017) somewhat ignores the fact 
that the agent’s identification of ‘the admirable’ is heavily influenced by prevailing socio-
cultural norms and values. This realization leads me to argue, in this section, that although 
the meaning of value terms such as virtue, good end, good motive, admirable life, desirable 
life and deontic terms such as duty, right action, wrong action could indeed be derived from 
‘the admirable’ (as Zagzebski argues, see for example, 2017, pp. 22-23), one must take into 
account that ‘the admirable’ has already been, to a large extent, determined for the agents 
by the prevailing social norms and values of the community (and is not to be determined 
by the agent in vacuo - or in spite of such socio-cultural influences - as Zagzebski’s theory, 
and other approaches to moral exemplarism - e.g. Blum, 1988; Annas, 2004, suggest). 
Thus, employing the emotion of admiration to identify the meaning of value and deontic 
terms leads to a culture-specific understanding of morality - which most scholars working 
on theories of moral exemplarism would want to resist.  
It is quite important to note, at this early stage, that this theoretical limitation does not 
necessarily stem from a relativistic understanding of morality. One could maintain an 
objective conception of morality10 and still argue that humans are social beings whose 
identification of ‘the admirable’ is greatly influenced by societal norms and values. In what 
                                                          
8Influenced in the sense that socio-cultural norms and values have a substantial impact on the values 
and persons one comes to admire.  
9A theoretical implication which I take for granted that everyone agrees is quite undesirable. I do 
not believe, for example, that Zagzebski would be willing to accept a gendered-specific 
understanding of morality.     
10It might be important to note that in this paper I am arguing neither in favor nor against the claim 
that morality is objective. Rather, I am arguing that the emotion of admiration is heavily influenced 
by prevailing socio-cultural norms and values.  
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follows, I give examples11 (taken from both ancient and contemporary societies) to 
illustrate my argument and pinpoint the problematic aspect of Zagzebski’s (2015, 2017) 
moral exemplarist theory when one considers the socio-cultural influences on what we 
consider admirable.  
 
2.1 Ancient Societies and ‘the Admirable’  
 
The first example I discuss, in order to illustrate my argument, is inspired by 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981) - as is the entire argument I am making in this section (i.e. 
Section 2). MacIntyre highlights that in ancient Greece there were different conceptions of 
virtue across different periods of time and city-states (see also Ferguson, 1958; Hobbs, 
2010). He identifies, for example, the heroic societies (in which kinship had a predominant 
role) - as depicted in Homerian poetry - and argues that the conception of virtue in such 
societies is quite different from the conceptions of virtue in the 5th century BC Athenian 
society (in which the polis had a predominant role - see also Ferguson, 1958; Hobbs, 2010): 
“The intervention of Athena and the resolution of the issue between her and Apollo 
establish a conception of justice which shifts the center of authority in moral questions 
from the family and the household to the polis… thus the first massive fact that we have to 
reckon with is the difference that it makes to the conception of the virtues when the primary 
moral community is no longer the kinship group, but the city-state.” (pp. 132-133). For 
example, according to MacIntyre, in heroic societies honor is what is due to the king while 
in 5th century BC Athens honor has become what is due to men (p. 200). This is a prominent 
example of how socio-cultural norms and values have a significant effect on the 
individual’s identification of ‘the admirable’. It shows how a shift in the prevailing social 
norms and values also changes the agents’ identification of admirable behaviors and 
persons. In heroic societies, one is admired for abiding to their duty towards their king 
while in Athens one is admired for abiding to their duty towards men.  
Again, according to MacIntyre (1981), rival conceptions of virtue exist even in the 
same city-state: “We therefore have to be wary of speaking too easily of 'the Greek view 
of the virtues' not just because we often say 'Greek' where we should say 'Athenian' but 
also because there were a number of Athenian views: those of the sophists, of Plato, of 
Aristotle and of the tragedians, especially Sophocles” (p. 135)12. These four rival 
                                                          
11I should note that my choice of examples to follow is not arbitrary: Homeric societies and the 5th 
century BC Athenian society are the main examples discussed by MacIntyre (in his book After 
Virtue) in order to show that there were different conceptions of virtue in ancient Greece (a view 
which has inspired my overall discussion and on which I rely for much of my argument). Nazi 
Germany is one of Zagzebski’s (2017) most extensively discussed examples. She is anticipating 
objections on this example and it thus seems fair to discuss it. Lastly, slavery in ancient societies is 
an example which Zagzebski discusses (see 2017, p. 113, note 9, where she discusses the abolition 
of slavery as evidence of social reforms being dependent upon external social conditions) though 
she seems to avoid discussing its connection to the emotion of admiration. Thus, I am discussing it 
because I believe its connection to admiration might be worth exploring.  
12For example, Aristotle draws a distinction between the virtue of sophia (theoretical wisdom) and 
the virtue of phronesis (practical wisdom) (e.g. EN, 1139b15-18 - see also Broadie, in Broadie and 
Rowe, 2011, p. 47). For Aristotle, being wise in theoretical matters does not entail that one is wise 
in practical affairs as well (EN, 1141b5-10). Contrarily, Plato thinks that the agent who is wise in 
theoretical matters is necessarily wise in practical ones too. (Rep., VI, 501b; VII, 540a–b). 
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conceptions of virtue dominated, and determined, the Athenian moral norms and values. 
Depending on one’s upbringing and social status, one would be influenced by a specific 
understanding of morality.  For example, according to the sophists’ understanding (which 
was one of the most well-established ones, and especially influential for the ruling class 
who were brought up with such conception - see Kerferd, 1981): “…expressions such as 
‘just’, ‘virtue’ and ‘good’…refer to qualities which are conducive to individual success” 
(p. 139). For instance, in book I of the Republic, Thrasymachus who represents the sophist 
tradition argues that “justice or right is really what is good for someone else, namely the 
interest of the stronger party or ruler, imposed at the expense of the subject who obeys 
him” (343c)13.  
The sophist understanding of virtue, being one of the most prevailing views on virtue 
in classical Athenian society, would greatly influence one’s identification of ‘the 
admirable’. For example, a student following the sophists’ teachings would not admire, 
and aspire to be, someone who they perceived as weak; but would rather look up to the 
strong. They would not admire the life of common men (no matter how objectively virtuous 
such a person might be) but only the life of those belonging to the ruling class. ‘The 
admirable’ is therefore largely influenced by the prevailing socio-cultural context. For 
example, in this case, it precludes the agent from considering the life of a common man 
(e.g. peasant or artisan) as admirable (and therefore worthy of emulation).  
 
2.2 Contemporary Societies and ‘the Admirable’  
 
Nowadays our identification of ‘the admirable’ is also largely influenced and partly 
determined by the prevailing moral norms and values of society. Zagzebski (2017) herself 
partly acknowledges as much: She notes that admiration is guided by the practices of a 
moral-linguistic community which changes its stereotypes about ‘the admirable’ over time 
(p. 187). According to her, “The extension of ‘good person’ is not determined privately, 
nor is it determined by democratic vote. Some members of the social linguistic network 
are linguistically privileged” (Ibid.). Still, according to Zagzebski, it is people with power 
that determine “… both the stereotype and the extension of moral terms” rather than those 
most qualified for the task (e.g. moral experts such as moral philosophers - p. 188). 
Zagzebski even proceeds to discuss an explicit way in which admiration can be 
manipulated: “Narratives can be controlled by the political, religious or educational 
authorities and the media, and our responses will be affected by the way they tell the 
narratives” (pp. 68-69). Still, according to Zagzebski, “…we can exercise critical 
judgement. For one thing, our personal responses are tests of the narrator’s point of view. 
In addition, there is often much more in a narrative than the narrator can consciously or 
unconsciously distort, and that serves as a partial test of the elements highlighted in the 
narrative...” (Ibid.). I believe that Zagzebski is rather quick to dismiss the theoretical 
weakness she has identified and is overly optimistic concerning our critical judgement and 
our ability to perceive things from an objective standpoint. Adding a clause of ‘critical self-
reflection’ does not remove the socio-cultural influences already embedded in our 
judgement of what is admirable. If that were the case, and agents were able to approach all 
narratives from an objective point of view and exercise critical judgement in vacuo, the 
history of humankind would have been, I believe, quite different.  
                                                          
13I am using Lee’s translation of the Republic (in Lee and Lane, 2007).  
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Consider, for example, the case of Nazi Germany. Most of the German population was 
convinced by the narrative that was created and controlled by the Nazi party (Mühlberger, 
2003). Those Germans convinced by the Nazi narrative had the capacity to exercise critical 
judgement but nevertheless admired Hitler - whose life and actions were portrayed by the 
Nazi party as the example that everyone should follow (see, e.g. Kershaw, 1989). This is 
quite a strong indication of how socially prevailing (and in this case, manipulated and 
imposed) moral norms and values influence an agent’s identification of ‘the admirable’. If 
one was to derive in Nazi Germany the meaning of value terms such as virtue, good end, 
good motive, admirable life, desirable life and deontic terms such as duty, right action, 
wrong action from ‘the admirable’, one would get quite different results than they would 
get in, for example, classical Athens. For instance, they would identify Hitler’s life as the 
admirable and desirable life.  
Of course, Zagzebski (2017) anticipates this objection and notes that “I cannot say 
with certainty that self-reflective Nazis could have figured out that there was something 
wrong with Hitler by comparing him with other persons they admired, but that is my 
hypothesis. A Nazi who is conscientious in my sense would reflect upon his admiration for 
Hitler, compare Hitler with other persons he admires, and compare his reaction to Hitler 
with the emotions of others he trusts” (p. 48)14. Still, again I find Zagzebski’s answer quite 
unsatisfactory and constructed outside of the practices her theory is attempting to 
systematize and justify. Judging from the history of Nazi Germany, only a small minority 
of Germans (assumingly the most virtuous ones, and thus not the ones in need to identify 
exemplars through admiration) was able to be critical of the Nazi propaganda and the 
prevailing moral norms and values (Schmiechen‐Ackermann, 2018). The vast majority of 
the population (presumably those who were in need of moral exemplars to improve in the 
moral domain) was greatly influenced by the Nazi narrative - a narrative which shaped 
their identification of ‘the admirable’.   
Still, one could argue that the case of Nazi Germany is a somewhat unique and rather 
extreme case (viz., a case of strong indoctrination and propaganda that were aided by the 
socioeconomic conditions in Germany at the time: e.g. war debts, Great Depression, losing 
WWI - see Eley, 2018 and Tooze, 2011); and that in ‘normal’ circumstances agents are 
reliably successful at employing their emotion of admiration in order to derive the meaning 
of terms such as virtue, duty and right action without being influenced (at least 
significantly) by the moral norms and values of society. But is this really the case? Leaving 
aside ‘extreme’ cases, it still seems that ‘the admirable’ is shaped by prevailing socio-
cultural moral norms and values. Consider, for example, another quite commonly used 
example in moral discussions: the case of slavery in classical Athens. Having slaves was 
the norm in the ancient Athenian society; it was not considered as something immoral (see, 
e.g. Cuffel, 1966) but was rather seen as a sign of social status, power and racial superiority 
(see, e.g. Rihll, 2011). Owning slaves would not preclude one from being admired. Thus, 
in this case the emotion of admiration leads to the conclusion that it is (at least) morally 
acceptable to have slaves or that (at least) a small part of the admirable life involves owning 
slaves. Today, we would definitely disagree with such statements (and with good reason) 
but the fact still remains that were we to be living in classical Athens, we would most likely 
admire persons who had slaves (not - necessarily - because they had slaves but also not in 
                                                          
14Note how similar Zagzebski’s (2017) reply to this objection is to Blum’s (1988, p. 215) argument 
that moral exemplars are “…appropriate objects of an all-things-considered admiration”.   
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spite of it) and if we were to employ our emotion of admiration to derive terms such as 
right action from it, we would not see slavery as morally wrong15.  
The entire discussion boils down to one’s understanding of moral emotions. As already 
noted, Zagzebski abides by a perceptual theory of emotions. She argues that emotions can 
be both epistemic and practical reasons for moral judgements. For instance, she notes: “If 
I admire E and reflectively endorse my state of admiring E, I have a reason to judge ‘E is 
admirable’” (2017, p. 145). Contrarily, my arguments (in both sections 2 and 3) stem from 
a social understanding of moral emotions: people are social creatures whose emotions are 
greatly influenced by sociocultural factors (see e.g. Haidt, 2001, 2007). Such an 
understanding of moral emotions “…deemphasizes the private reasoning done by 
individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences” 
(Haidt, 2001, p. 814). A significant part of my critique of Zagzebski’s moral exemplarism 
theory rests on the fact that she considers emotions, such as admiration, in vacuo and fails 
to take into consideration that they are greatly influenced by socio-cultural factors.  
All in all, I have argued in this section that Zagzebski (2015, 2017) fails to note in her 
moral exemplarist theory that the agents’ identification of ‘the admirable’ is largely 
influenced by the prevailing socio-cultural norms and values. Thus, deriving terms such as 
good life, virtue and duty from ‘the admirable’ leads to a culture-specific understanding of 
morality. Notably, it leads to a conception of morality that is not determined by the few 
truly virtuous agents (or in accordance with their personality and behavior) but by the non-
virtuous majority and/or by those controlling the narratives (that determine who should be 
admired). This theoretical limitation originates from a claim that lies at the center of 
exemplarist moral theories according to which admiration - if employed in a reflective 
manner - is not (significantly) influenced by socio-cultural norms. This is a core theory 
claim (featuring in all moral exemplarist approaches, e.g. Blum, 1988; Annas, 2004) which 
cannot be removed without heavily distorting the theory. Biting the bullet on this limitation 
leads to a theory which holds that ‘the admirable’ can be used to determine moral norms 
and values but nonetheless is quite often unreliable and quite prone to socio-cultural 
influences - and thus leads to a culture-relative understanding of morality.  
One could reply that the charge of cultural relativism is an old objection to virtue 
ethics. Virtue scholars have argued that cultural relativism is not a unique problem to ethics 
- other theories share this problem - (see, for example, Solomon, 1988; Hursthouse and 
Pettigrove, 2016) and some have even argued that virtue ethics deal better with cultural 
relativism than other theories (see, for example, Nussbaum, 1993). Still, my aim in this 
paper is not to revive the cultural-relativity objection to virtue ethics but rather to highlight 
that Zagzebski’s (2015, 2017) exemplarist moral theory, and previous versions of moral 
exemplarism (e.g. Blum, 1988; Annas, 2004), lead necessarily - because of their reliance 
                                                          
15One could argue that my understanding of the agents’ identification of ‘the admirable’ is very 
deterministic and does not allow room to account for social change. My view is that social change 
(e.g. abolition of slavery in USA) is brought about by a change in the prevailing socio-cultural 
norms and values (due to, for example, historical events such as the American Civil War) which in 
turn affect the agents’ identification of ‘the admirable’. Still, note that I am not arguing that morality 
is fully determined by society. For example, not all Germans in Nazi Germany were in favor of 
Hitler. Rather, I am arguing that the emotion of admiration is highly vulnerable to socio-cultural 
influences. The majority of Germans living in Nazi Germany, being influenced by the Nazi 
narrative, admired Hitler. 
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on the agents’ identification of ‘the admirable’ - to a culture-relative understanding of 
morality.   
 
3. Gender Identity and Exemplarism 
 
The second limitation of Zagzebski’s (2015, 2017) exemplarist moral theory - a 
limitation which again can also be found in previous versions of moral exemplarism (e.g. 
Blum, 1988; Annas, 2004) - is closely interlinked with the one discussed in the previous 
section (section 2). Both limitations stem from the realization that the theory disregards the 
societal contexts (in which moral practices take place) that largely influence our 
identification of ‘the admirable’. This second limitation rests on the observation that 
Zagzebski fails to consider that an agent’s identification of ‘the admirable’ is largely 
influenced by several of the agent’s features and characteristics (which, in turn, have 
already been shaped by societal norms and practices). Such features and characteristics 
include gender, age, race and social status. In this paper, I focus on how consideration of 
gender differences undermines moral exemplarism. Again, it is worthwhile noting 
beforehand that this limitation does not stem from a relativistic conception of morality. 
One could hold an objective understanding of morality but nonetheless agree with the 
theoretical limitation identified in this section. In what follows, I discuss examples that 
highlight the import of gender for exemplarist theories. The examples are taken from both 
ancient societies (subsection 3.1) and contemporary ones (subsection 3.2).   
 
3.1 Gender Identity and ‘the Admirable’ in Ancient Greece  
 
This second limitation I identify in Zagzebski’s (2015, 2017) moral exemplarist theory 
is based on, and inspired by, Butler’s (1990) arguments according to which gender is a 
social construction. Butler argues that categories of gender are not biologically determined 
but social constructs - viz., constructed through language and social practices (discourse). 
Gender categories do not have any inherent ‘reality’; they are in their entirety the product 
of social processes. According to Butler (1990), agents are taught and expected to act in 
accordance to their socially constructed gender category16. Resistance to gender constructs 
is quite difficult (although not impossible, especially at a micro level - e.g. gender parody 
through the art of ‘drag’) because such categories are strongly embedded and taken for 
granted in our culture17. For instance, it is quite unthinkable to think of a person as 
‘agender’ (i.e. as not having a gender).   
Butler’s identification of gender as a social construct has quite significant implications 
for moral exemplarism. In this section of the paper, I argue that the gender identity of the 
agent - viz. one’s sense of their own gender (which may or may not correlate with the 
                                                          
16See also, Bussey and Bandura (2004) who argue that there are three social learning processes 
through which children come to acquire their gender identity: (i) directly being taught about it, (ii) 
enactive experience and (iii) observational learning. Still, unlike Butler (1990), they follow a 
socialization approach to gender, i.e. they understand gender as pre-existing categories that are 
inherently real.  
17See Nussbaum (2012) for a criticism of Butler’s (1990) views. More specifically, Nussbaum is 
especially critical of Butler’s position that there is little room for resistance to the socially 
constructed gender categories - see Nussbaum, 2012, p. 200.  
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gender one was ascribed at birth) - largely influences the moral understanding the agent 
would develop through the emotion of admiration. This is a feature of exemplarism that 
Zagzebski (2015, 2017) and other scholars (Blum 1988; Annas, 2004) supporting this 
moral approach have failed to take note of. The prevailing socio-cultural norms and social 
constructs impose different moral expectations on different gender categories. Agents are 
expected and taught to behave (in all matters, including moral) in accordance to their 
gender category18. Thus, employing the emotion of admiration to derive value and deontic 
terms results in a counter-intuitive, gender-specific understanding of morality.  
It is often quite easier to examine such an issue in societies of the past rather than in 
contemporary societies, as it allows for a somewhat more objective analysis of the matter 
in question. For instance, in Homeric poetry, women exemplars (i.e. women considered 
worthy of admiration) are depicted as having a different kind of moral focus than men (i.e. 
men considered worthy of admiration). In Homer’s Odyssey, Ulysses (i.e. the moral male 
exemplar) is depicted as the smart and brave Greek hero while Penelope (i.e. the female 
moral exemplar) is depicted as instantiating the virtue of patience and loyalty to one’s 
husband (see e.g. Pantelia, 1993)19. The normal order of life is women taking care of the 
household while men take care of ‘men business’ (see Snyder, 1981, p. 193; Pamelia, 1993, 
497; see also Od. 1.356-58, 21.350-52 and Il. 6.490-92). Thus, in ancient Greece, agents 
deploying their emotion of admiration to derive the meaning of deontic and value terms 
develop a gender-specific understanding of morality. They receive different moral 
guidance (and moral training), depending on their gender, from fictional exemplars such 
as Ulysses and Penelope. Men aspire to be like male Greek heroes, such as Ulysses, and 
women are raised to look up to the ideal of women such as Penelope20.  
Nevertheless, one could note that in ancient Greek societies women were (quite often) 
not seen as equal to men21. For example, the prevailing societal norms were that women 
should not be the recipients of formal education22. Also, discussing morality, and 
philosophy in general, was a task only for men. For example, Platonic dialogues, with the 
notable exception of Diotima23 (Symposium), are dominated by male interlocutors. Thus, 
one could argue that the gender-specific understanding of morality that is derived from the 
emotion of admiration is not a theoretical limitation but rather a problematic aspect of 
                                                          
18See, also, Bourdieu, 2002.  
19For example, Pantelia (1993, p. 497) notes that “Penelope's weaving of a shroud for Odysseus' 
father reflects her commitment to her husband's family and symbolizes her loyalty to the patrilinear 
order which she is determined to protect”.  
20This section of the paper should not be read as implying that an individual should identify 
themselves as either male or female. Rather, I am examining how these two socially constructed 
categories of gender affect the agents’ identification of ‘the admirable’ and I am thus limiting my 
discussion to this (wrong) binary understanding of gender.  
21See, for example, Aristotle’s comment in the Politics: “The male is by nature superior and the 
female inferior, the male ruler and the female subject” (1254b13–14) - I am using Rackham’s 
translation of the Politics (in Rackham, 1932). For more on this topic see Frede, 2018.  
22Plato was an exception. He thought, contra-Aristotle, that women should be formally educated 
(see, e.g., Rep., V, 456c13-d1). Still, Plato did not have a much better opinion for women than 
Aristotle did: “…and it is natural for women to take part in all occupations as well as men, though 
in all women will be the weaker partners” (455d10-15).  
23Diotima is presumably entitled to an opinion - despite being a woman - because of her social 
status as a high priestess.  
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societies which perceive men as the pre-eminent moral agents. Nonetheless, I believe that 
this does not refute the objection I am putting forward. Agents would develop, through the 
emotion of admiration, a gender-specific understanding of morality in contemporary 
societies too. In the next subsection, I proceed to discuss examples to illustrate this claim.  
 
3.2 Gender Identity and ‘the admirable’ in Contemporary Societies 
 
In contemporary societies, similarly, several core characteristics and features of the 
agent (such as gender identity) largely affect the guidance and moral training they would 
receive through moral exemplars (as identified through the emotion of admiration). 
Consider, for example, the large number of Hollywood action movies (especially those in 
the 70’s, 80’s and 90’s) which tell the stories of heroes extracting revenge. In their vast 
majority, such movies promoted white heterosexual male norms (see e.g., Mizejewski, 
2004; King, 2008)24,25. The heroes extracting revenge are usually men who are depicted as 
having the (physical and mental) power and courage to extract revenge and defeat evil. The 
leading evil characters are again, in their vast majority, men - presumably because only 
men are powerful enough to be evil. In such movies, women usually play a secondary role 
and are portrayed (depending on their age) as either the object of passion or as a source of 
motherly warmth (see e.g. Gauntlett, 2008, p. 37; Bussey and Bandura, 2004, p. 109).  
Such fictional characters that are still admired for their character and behavior - and 
thus largely influence our understanding of morality, especially of those of a young age26 
(see Milkie, 1994) - project that male-identified individuals should portray characteristics 
of courage and revenge while female-identified individuals should project an image of 
passion and/or warmth. Thus, depending on the gender category of the person seeking 
moral guidance and training, they would get different results. The male-identified 
individual will think highly of moral actions that aim at promoting values such as honor - 
and a behavior that is more suitable for their masculine identity, e.g. seeking revenge and/or 
being courageous - while the female-identified individual will think that it is more 
appropriate for their gender to behave in a manner that promotes values such as sensuality, 
compassion and warmth27. In other words, male-identified individuals are more likely to 
admire and associate themselves with male exemplars (and the values they are 
instantiating) while female-identified individuals are more likely to admire and associate 
themselves with female exemplars (and the values instantiated by them) (see e.g. Bussey 
and Bandura, 1984, 2004; Carducci, 2009, p. 493). Thus, moral exemplarism contributes 
                                                          
24For example, Mizejewski (2004) notes that “the testosterone-heavy 1970s American box office 
was no place for the woman investigator” (p. 118).  
25King (2008) notes, for example, that “women are featured as cop action heroes in 24 Hollywood 
films (dating from 1973’s Cleopatra Jones), compared to 267 that star only men” (p. 238).  
26The significance of narratives for moral learning has long been noted. See, for example Republic, 
III, 377c: “Shall we therefore readily allow our children to listen to any stories made up by anyone, 
and to form opinions that are for the most part the opposite of those we think they should have 
when they grow up? ...Then it seems that our first business is to supervise the production of stories, 
and choose only those we think suitable, and reject the rest”.  
27This difference is also reflected in movie preferences (which are again largely influenced by the 
social constructs of gender). Male-identified individuals prefer action movies over romantic ones 
while female-identified individuals prefer romantic movies over action ones (Greenwood, 2010).  
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to the consolidation of a gender-specific understanding of morality because it relies on the 
identification of ‘the admirable’ which is substantially influenced by the social construct 
of gender.  
Still, as it has already been pointed out, exemplars need not be only fictional. Male-
identified individuals are brought up to admire the personality traits of male athletes and 
businessmen whereas female-identified individuals are taught to admire the personality 
traits of female pop stars and models28,29 (see Bussey and Bandura, 2004, p. 108; Carducci 
2009, p. 493). Moreover, not only virtues, but one’s perception of value terms (such as 
good life and admirable life) is largely affected by gender identity. Being beautiful, for 
example, seems to be a much more important constituent of a good life for female-
identified individuals than for their male counterparts (and this again is influenced by 
society’s views on female beauty - see e.g. Meyers, 2011; Anderson, 2019).  
Besides gender, there are also other characteristics and features of an agent that 
considerably influence their identification of ‘the admirable’. For example, age is another 
such characteristic (see for example Richard and Krüger, 2006; see also Lockwood, 
Chaster and Wong, 2005 on how age affects one’s responses to positive and negative role 
models). Different age groups admire different persons and different behaviors (since 
society heavily influences how one should act in accordance to the age group they belong). 
Nowadays, a young male-identified teenager is more likely to admire the traits of an athlete 
(and to identify them as an exemplar) than the traits of “a woman…who is impeccably 
groomed and keeps her house always ready for company, while caring for her husband 
with Alzheimer’s” (Zagzebski, 2017, p. 36). I should note that while Zagzebski discusses 
this example (amongst other examples of agents she admires) she fails to consider that such 
a woman is more likely to be the object of admiration of a middle-aged person rather than 
of a teenager. She completely disregards the import of the agent’s features and 
characteristics, and the impact of socio-cultural norms on what is expected by specific 
categories of people, on the agent’s identification of ‘the admirable’30.  
                                                          
28Of course, I am not implying that athletes and businessmen need to be male in order to be worthy 
of our admiration as I am also not implying that popstars and models need to be female in order to 
be admirable. What I am suggesting rather is that we have been brought up in a society where we 
have been taught that boys should admire male athletes and businessmen whereas girls should 
admire female popstars and models. In other words, our identification of ‘the admirable’ is not 
objective but has been substantially influenced by social learning and expectations. 
29The main support for my arguments comes from Bussey and Bandura’s (1984, 2004) theory of 
social learning. Significantly, their work ‘Social cognitive theory of gender development and 
functioning’ (2004) is a summary of approximately 400 studies on the impact of socio-cultural 
factors on gender development and modeling in children and youngsters. These studies go beyond 
the question of whether the agents’ admiration is reflective or not. They attempt to capture what 
happens in ‘real practice’ and show that in actual practice socio-cultural influences have a great 
impact on our identification, and subsequent emulation, of ‘the admirable’. 
30Zagzebski (2017, Chapter 1) also discusses exemplars such as Leopold Socha, Jean Vanier and 
Confucius. It should be noted that these three examples do not undermine my argument. It still 
remains the case that the vast majority of young male-identified individuals are (due to socio-
cultural influences) brought up to admire the personality traits of male athletes and businessmen 
whereas female-identified individuals are brought up to admire the personality traits of female pop 
stars and models.  
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One could argue that Zagzebski (2015, 2017) and other scholars working on moral 
exemplarism (e.g. Blum, 1988; Annas, 2004) have on purpose omitted to discuss the import 
of the agent’s features and characteristics (such as age and gender) on the agent’s 
identification of ‘the admirable’ as it would complicate their theoretical approach without 
offering anything noteworthy. I agree that taking into consideration such features and 
characteristics complicates matters but also reveals an important limitation of exemplarist 
approaches; namely that employing ‘the admirable’ to derive deontic and value terms leads 
to a departmentalized understanding of morality according to the socially constructed 
categories one belongs. It leads, for example, to a counter-intuitive gender-specific 
understanding of morality. This forces me to question the efficacy of the theory of moral 
exemplarism31.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Irrespectively of whether one understands moral exemplarism as a distinct theory 
(Zagzebski, 2015; 2017) or as an approach that complements virtue ethics (Blum, 1988; 
Annas, 2004), the core theoretical principle remains the same: the emotion of admiration 
enables agents to identify and imitate virtuous persons. Still, as I have argued, moral 
exemplarism has two significant limitations that render it somewhat problematic as an 
approach. The first core limitation of exemplarism is that it fails to take into consideration 
the socio-cultural influences that largely affect, and partly determine, our identification of 
‘the admirable’ and examines it instead in vacuo. I have argued that employing the emotion 
of admiration to derive deontic and value terms leads to a cultural-relativistic conception 
of morality. The second core limitation of the theory is that it fails to take into account the 
plethora of characteristics and features of an agent - such as gender identity and age - that 
also largely influence the agent’s identification of ‘the admirable’. This has led me to argue 
that relying on the emotion of admiration for moral guidance and training leads to a 
segregated (e.g. gender-specific, age-specific, etc.) understanding of morality.  
Nonetheless, not all is in vain - there is still a positive takeaway message. Taking into 
consideration the sociocultural factors that influence admiration can give us insights and 
helps us truly understand how moral admiration and imitation operate. Understanding 
admiration for what it is (i.e. greatly influenced by sociocultural factors) can be of 
significant practical and theoretical merit. Such an understanding can inform and have 
significant import for exemplar-based accounts of moral education32. It can also lead to the 
development of moral theories which build on ‘the admirable’ without being constructed 
outside of the practices such theories are attempting to systematize and justify.  
 
                                                          
31Still, this should not be taken to imply that there is nothing of value to be found in Zagzebski’s 
exemplarist theory. For example, according to her theory, the emotion of admiration evokes in 
agents the desire to become a better person (see, e.g., Zagzebski, 2017, p. 152). This is one of the 
stronger features of Zagzebski’s account. My aim is not to dispute this point but rather to show that 
Zagzebski has not taken into consideration the socio-cultural influences on the agents’ 
identification of ‘the admirable’.  
32For one, it would make educators aware of the socio-cultural influences on admiration and lead 
them to develop educational methods that safeguard against a segregated understanding of morality.  
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